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The lessons of history cannot be learned until
behind us.

the past is truly

Memoirs and contemporary accounts by participants and

observers can assist historians

in their tasks or contribute to

obscurity by blazing false trails which must be sorted out before
the

11

truth 11 may be discovered.

The test for the' h i st or i an

tinguishing the false from the true trails.

is d is-

Pub] ic officials can

assist future historians or make their work more difficult by the
qua 1 i ty of record they 1 eave behind.
Henry Kissinger 1 s White House Years wil 1 confound future historians more than provide illumination because it blazes numerous
false trails,

lacks analytical

bility and obscures critical

int~grity, frequently lacks credi-

issues as often if not more often

than it provides enlightenment.

No living person comes off badly

in the book; yet none quite measures up to Kissinger's own qualities
of intelligence, comprehension or vision.
To be sure, Kissinger is frequently self-deprecating but
always to the end that we are assured that his mastery knows no
peers, that while.he is not infallible, others are more fallible.
In the few instances when Nixon differed sharply on pol icy,
Kissinger brought him around so things turned out well after all.
Nixon had, Kissinger avers, a better feel
one must give credi-t where due.

for public relations~

But Nixon was deprived of great-

ness because he was mean, petty; vindictive,

isolated and suspicious.

Yet he was courageous; witness: the opening to China, the Allende
ouster in Chile, the perseverance in Vietnam, extending the war to

2

Cambodia.

Nixon's "courage" stands in bold contrast to those less

resourceful and courageous around hi~ such as Secretaries Laird
and Rogers, Ambassadors Bunker and Lodge, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
and General Haig -- stalwart men all

but not of Nixon's (or Kissinger's)

mettle.
When North Korean MIG fighters shot down an unarmed US reconnaissance intelligence plane over the Sea of Japan in April
Nixon was restrained from bombing North Korea
the strong opposition of Rogers and Laird.

11

1969,

primari ly because of

But as always when suppress-

ing his instinct for a jugular response, Nixon looked for some other
place to demonstrate his mettle."

(p. 247) Kissinger tells us that

Cambodian targets were selected as surrogates for Nixon 1 s "jugular
response".
The period covered.by this book, January, 1969 to January, 1973,
covers Nixon's first administration and the author's tenure as
National Security Advisor.

With the second term came appointment

as Secretary of State which post he held coterminously with his
Advisor's post until
January, 1977,

the inauguration of President Carter in

Kissinger's "record" of the second term will

presented in a companion volume to be published subsequently.

be
One

can but hope that that volume wi 11 be more revealing and less pretentiously literary than

White House Years.

The Forbidden City's

"yellow roofs seeming to tumble 1 ike waterfalls into the pools of
sand •

II

(P. 749) exemplifies a 1 iterary reach beyond the

author 1 s grasp.
The book is replete with vignettes describing world leaders
with whom Kissinger was associated.

While praised by some reviewers,
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these biographical diversions are often shallow, condescending,
and unilluminating.
former

While many of us might be intimidated by

l~rael i Foreign Minister Abba Eban 1 s (born, reared and educated

in England as Aibrey Epstein) mastery of the English language,
K i s s i n g er I s react 'i on was that
acquired language.

11

(p.

11

Eng 1 i sh was for me, after a 1 1 , an

359)

Kissinger 1 s record was not one of unmixed success of stellar
accomplishments piled one upon another.

In part he limited his

opportunities by his penchant for secrecy and monopoly of decision,
·attributes he shared with President Nixon.

Kissinger disdained the

career practitioners in State, Defense, Treasury, and the CIA as
bureaucrats who provided obstacles to pol icy formulation and
implementation.

Not one instance is mentioned throughout the

fjfteen hundred pages wherein the career service - a rather welltrained, experienced set of professionals on the whole - performed
any substantative, creative or important roles in making and carrying out pol icy.
of foreign

Of course they did, else the government 1 s conduct

policy would have ground to a

halt.

Curiously the only

predecessor singled out for high praise, Dean Acheson, earne:d.
Kissinger 1 i praise for his management of the bureaucracy,- for his
skillful use of all of the tools of statecraft.
In crisis situations such as that attending the Cuban missiles
in 1962, decisions are made with 1 ittle or no search for

information.

Neither time nor opportunity for searching is available.

Kissinger 1 s

account depicts routine decisions being made in the same way as those
made during crises.
doing something fast,

While this may be a more efficient process for
it created marvelous opportunities for
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ignorance of conditions and events to have significant impact upon
decisions.

Kissinger was unprepared for and reacted with hostility

toward West Germany's Ostopol itik, opening relations with the Easr
Europeans and the Russians

independently.

The signs had al 1 been

there; Kissinger simply had neither time nor opportunity to become
sufficiently aware of the impending change in German foreign policy.
Kissinger tel ls of receiving Chancellor Brandt's emissary,
Egon Bahr at the White- House with Assistant Secretary of State
Hillenbrand sitting in to represent the State Department.

At the

end of their formal meeting, Bahr left the White House by the
front door.
talk with me

"He reentered it through the basement for a private
As with my channels with Dobrynin to Moscow,

with Pakistan to China and on occasion with

Israel and even Egypt,

my contact with Egon Bahr became a White House backchannel by
which Nixon could manage diplomacy bypassing the State Department.
(page411)

Thus were normal diplomatic channels undercut and

rendered largely useless.
Nixon app6inted William Rogers Secretary of State, says
Kissinger, because he was f~lt to be incompetent in foreign
affairs and ineffectual; but, nevertheless a friend whose loyalty
_J

would remain true - he would pose no threat to Nixon.
Curiously, the only area of foreign pol icy that was left to
the Secretary of State for his
policy was the Middle East.

11

independent 11 administration of

Kissinger attributes that to Nixon's

uncertainty as to what Middle East pol icy should be and to
Kissinger's "Jewish backg_r.ound 11 •

!

Until mid 1971, the Middle East

was not central to or even very important for American pol icy.

11
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Yet these were years that witnessed Nasser's death and Sadat's
succession in Egypt, Qaddafi 1 s seizure of power in Libya, and
the radicalization of politics _in Syria and Iraq.
Additionally the United States engaged in rather significantly
increased arms shipments to Israel; shipments that were to be
matched in kind by the USSR to the Arabs.

The end result was

reached in the October (1973) Arab-Israeli war which witnessed
larger tank battles than any engaged in during World War I I.
the initial Egyptian invasion of the Sinai

Indeed

included more tanks than

the Germans used to invade Russia in June 1941.

Almost inadvertently,

the arms race in the Middle East had gotten out of hand, had
escalated to alarming proportions that consequently greatly enhanced the cost in terms of money and of human lives.
There are curious omissfons in
perhaps explainable by Kissinger's

White House Years that are
inattention or by his careful

exclusi0n of it~ms that might not be quite so flattering to his
self-image.

Cyprus, for example, never appears

in the discussion

although it could hardly be'omitted from his second volume.
Kissinger wa~
Makarios.

impla~a.bly hostile to Cypriot President Archbishop

Kissinger frequently referred to Makarios as the

Mediterranean Castro yet he bore little resemblance to Castro Makarios was a conservative religious figure.

Makarios was

independent and steered clear of both Russian and American spheres
of influence.

All of the consequences for our pol icy today need

no elaboration at this point.

6
this is omitted as is any reference to the Greek junta whose
machinations provided the US with difficult problems.
Iran was to become for Kissinger the most important Middle
Eastern power destined to provide military protection for the
Perslan Gulf, the Straits of Hormuz (through which 40% of all Western
oil

is transported) the Arabain Sea and the Arabian Peninsula.

In

order to accomplish these ends, the Shah was encouraged to purchase
•

•

I

enormous quant1t1es of weapons in order to build up a military force
second to none in the region and indeed ultimately surpassing those
of Britain, France or Germany.
this set of actions,

Many observers have concluded that

this interest indicated by Kissinger contributed

to the Shah 1 s growing m~galom~nia leading ultimately to his downfall.
Yet to Kissinger,

11

he was rather shy and withdrawn.

I could never

escape the impression that he was a gentle, even sentimental man
who had schooled himself

in the maxim that the ruler must~b~ aloof

and hard, but had never succeeded in making it come naturally.
majestic side was

ike a role rehearsed over the years.

he was a prisoner

suspect, of the needs of his fate,

His

In this,
just as

he was ultimately the victim of his own successes." (page 1259)
To Kissinger,

the Shah was

11

a dedicated reformer" and a true

p r o g r e s s i v e i n t h a t h e s o u g h t t o mo d e r n i z e a nd i n d u s t r i a l i z e h i s
society.

There is no indication that Kissinger was aware of or

sensitive to the fact that there was a large and powerful opposition
to the Shah that might supplant him.

The old addage of politics

that one should not put all of one's eggs in one basket was

ignored

to the end that in the latter part of the Shah's regime we rel led
on him to inform us of such things as his durability and stability.

7

On the eve of his election in 1968, Candidate Richard Nixon
said that he,had a secret plan to end the war in Vietnam.
plan existed of course;

No such

indeed, shortly after coming into office the

Nixon administration escalated the war in Vietnam considerably beyond
the 1 imits imposed by his predecessor. The war was played to disasterous conclusion four years later well after the new election on
the eve of which Kissinger declared to an anxious public that
is at hand 11

•

Careful

11

peace

reading of Kissinger 1 s volume leads to one

principal conclusion: that the extension of the war for four and
one-half more years was occasioned by the need to guarantee the
reelection of Richard Nixon for a second term.

Once the. election

had taken place, the war was settled on terms quite favorable to
North Vietnam; terms according to Kissinger, that had been available
several years earlier.

To be sure, Kissinger states that the North

Vietnamese could have had those terms four years earlier but had
rejected them; however, his case isn't convincing by his own
account.

The extended war resulted in the ultimate destruction of

Laos as a viable independent state and in Cambodia 1 s descent

into

a malestrom of bestiality, disease, famine and destruction.

The

end result of Kissinger 1 s management of the war and the settlement
of the peace with North Vietnam has been the uniting of North and
South Vietnam and the establishment of Vietnamese hegemony over
Laos and Cambodia.

Thailand today stands exposed and endangered

by Vietnamese troops on her borders.
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The disarray facing the world today is largely the result of
the Nixon-Kissinger management of American power during their term
of office.

Kissinger was convinced,

in large measure correctly,

that the principal overriding fact of the 'international

relations

today is the relationship of the United States and the Soviet Union.
Ln order to manipulate this relationship properly, the Soviet Union
had to have parity with the United States as a major power.
Kissinger was convinced that intelligent statecraft would then
permit the two to have a functional

condominium in global affairs.

Everything was sacrificed to this end and permitted enormous difficulties to be raised.
The Nixon shock, that almost benign term that covers a neardeclaration of economic warfare against Germany and Japan; fit

in

we] 1 with American pol icy because it permitted the US and Soviet
Union to play a major role.

That it destroyed in essence the

al 1 iance relationship that we had with Japan and Germany was not
adequately comprehended by Kissinger.

Our al 1 ies were put on

notice that we would act unilaterally even if

it

hurt them.

Hence

when first we embargoed Iranian 6i1, Japan's initial

response was

to continue importing. it despite American pres~ure.

Similarly,

France and Germa~y resisted American leadership in dealing
with the Soviet Onion and Europe to the end that the do] Jar is
under attack and the economic position of the United States is
not threatened by the Soviet Union so much as it is threatened
by our allies.
This conflict with our al 1 ies was not foreordained but was a
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direct result of American mismanagemeNt of international economic
relationships under the bluster and fundamental

ignorance of

Treasury Secretary Connally 1 s blunderbus approach which led to the·
scuttling of the Bretton Woods agreement which established the
postwar international moietary system and which has not yet beeM
replaced.

International financial markets are in near chaos and

that chaos

is largely attributable to the management of American

economic relations.
Kissinger indicates that this occurred largely because he was
preoccupied and did not take enough in~erest in economic issues.
Indeed, he states that he n~eded some tutoring by Undersecretary
Peterson, who was subsequently removed from his position in the
Treasury and promoted to Secretary of Commerce and denied access
to highlevel discussions of economic issues because he did not
agree with the basic thrust.

Indeed, even Federal Reserve Board

Chairman Arthur Burns is said to have urged kissinger to stan~
firm because the United States needed an economic pol icy that
would replace the scuttled international system with a new
monetary system.

Such replacement has yet to be achieved and

the dollar ~nd gold marke~s are rather unstable and in a state
of disarray.
Henry Kissinger is a brilliantjcontemplative person who will
at some future day, hopefully, write down a record that will permit
proper evaluation of his conduct of our foreign pol icy during the
Nixon-Ford years.

This book was written to take advantage of the

market and serves as a useful vehiele to propel him into a senior
post- in the next Republ lean· administrati"on or perhaps even the

I0

Democratic administration.

As such it is a useful volume for a

campaign document for Henry Kissinger seeker of portfolio.

It

is

not a terribly u~eful historical document nor an adequate representation of his very notable

accomplishments.
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